Insurance companies, employer pension plans, and the U.S. government all provide annuities and therefore assume aggregate mortality risk. Using the widely-cited Lee-Carter mortality model, we quantify aggregate mortality risk as the risk that the average annuitant lives longer than is predicted by the model, and we determine that annuities expose providers to substantial risk. We also find that other recent actuarial forecasts lie at the edge or outside of Lee-Carter's 95% confidence interval, suggesting even more uncertainty about future mortality.
INTRODUCTION
Annuities provide a means by which risk-averse households can insure themselves against the risk of outliving their wealth in old age. Annuitization is predicted to raise average expected utility under a variety of assumptions (Brown, Davidoff, and Diamond 2005) , yet voluntary annuity purchases are rare. Only 7.4% of elderly households had voluntarily annuitized any of their wealth between 1993 and 2000 (Dushi and Webb 2004) .
1 Immediate annuity sales were only $10.2 billion in 2001 (NAVA 2002) , and approximately half of that total may have been life-contingent (Brown and Poterba 2000) . 2 Interest in private annuities may jump, though, as annuitized defined benefit pensions provided by employers in the United States and United Kingdom are largely replaced by lumpsum defined contribution pensions, and even more so if Social Security is similarly transformed using private accounts. 3 Thus, it is important to understand why the market for private annuities is so meager. One reason may involve difficulties faced by annuity providers in managing aggregate mortality risk. Annuity providers face two kinds of mortality risk: idiosyncratic risk, since any particular annuitant may live longer than anticipated; and aggregate risk, since annuitants may on average live longer than expected. 4 The business of insurers is to eliminate idiosyncratic risk through riskpooling. The latter risk is non-diversifiable unless the insurer can write other classes of business, for example life insurance, with negatively correlated risks.
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The growing reluctance of employers to take on aggregate mortality risk has been offered as one of the explanations for the shift in private pension structure (ACA 2005, pp.13-14) .
Forecasting life expectancy 50 or 100 years hence involves taking a controversial position on the potential for either scientific discoveries to slow the aging process or emergent crises to hasten it. S. Jay Olshansky and Stephen 1 These statistics were computed from the Asset and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old, a large, nationally representative panel of households with a member born before 1924. 2 Sales of deferred annuities substantially exceed those of immediate annuities. A deferred annuity offers tax deferral but, when sold to individuals, lack the essential feature of an immediate annuity, namely the irrevocable exchange of a capital sum in return for a lifetime income. Individuals may withdraw deferred annuity assets in the form of a lifetime income, but rarely do so. 3 Some Social Security privatization proposals involve annuitization. Investment funds in Chile must offer voluntary annuities. Until April 2006, the U.K. required that "individual pensions" be annuitized by the age of 75. 4 Since adverse selection is not our focus, we simplify the analysis by ignoring uncertainty over the degree of selection experienced by an insurer. 5 Milevsky and Promislow (2005) discuss this possibility. The scope for doing so is limited by the difference in average age of life insurance and annuity holders. Mortality shocks differ in magnitude and occasionally even in sign across ages.
Austad, two of the most famous researchers in the field, have wagered $500 million on whether someone recently born will live to 150 by 2150. 6 Providers of immediate annuities and potential annuitants make their decisions over much shorter time horizons. 7 With shorter horizons, it is common to use models that combine extrapolations of past trends with a consideration of possible medical shocks, while avoiding a strong position about them. Purely extrapolative models fit the data closely, perform well in-sample, and, importantly for our purpose, quantify the uncertainty surrounding future mortality.
Yet, past forecasts from extrapolative models carry wide margins of error in their point estimates of expected mortality rates. Using such forecasts will expose annuity providers to substantial aggregate mortality risk. We consider a number of ways in which annuity providers could manage this risk. We assess by how much insurance companies would need to mark up the annuity premium or increase their capital reserves so as to gain protection against specified levels of risk. A more efficient alternative would involve transferring aggregate mortality risk to a third party by purchasing mortality-contingent bonds, with payments that depend on the mortality experience of a reference population. A few such bonds have recently been proposed or issued. We calculate the returns that one such bond would have paid had it been available over a long period, and we determine the risk premium that investors would have required to hold such a bond. As far as we know, no other paper in the economics literature has applied capital asset pricing models to price aggregate risks which beset the insurance industry. 8 This paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 of the paper, we discuss the literature on aggregate mortality risk and present the Lee-Carter (1992) model, which -according to Deaton and Paxson (2004) -has become the "leading statistical model of mortality in the demographic literature." It has been adopted by the U.S. Census Bureau, among others, and was viewed favorably by the Social Security Administration's 1999 technical advisory panel. 9 The predictions of both the Social Security Administration and published life tables underestimate future mortality improvements, in comparison with the Lee-Carter model. While the Lee-Carter estimates are based on a long time-series of data, the degree of divergence across expert forecasts suggests that even the Lee-Carter confidence intervals fail to capture the true magnitude of aggregate mortality risk. To this end, we consider the sensitivity of these and other calculations in the paper to a large, temporary, negative mortality shock or to discrete medical advances.
In Sections 2 and 3, we study aggregate mortality risk faced by insurance companies; much of this analysis can be extended to annuities provided by pension plans (as in Dushi, Friedberg, and Webb 2006) and by Social Security. In Section 2, we calculate the shareholders' capital reserves and/or premium loadings that would be required to reduce to specified percentages the risk that capital is exhausted by aggregate mortality-related losses, as predicted by the LeeCarter model. Under typical assumptions, the capital reserve/mark-up needed to reduce the probability of insolvency to 5% lies in the range of 2.7-3.3% for a typical annuity sold to couples between the ages of 65 and 85.
The Society of Actuaries recommends that insurance companies use Projection Scale AA as a basis for forecasting mortality improvements. We show in Section 3 that annuities based on Projection Scale AA without any conservative margin would be underpriced by amounts that typically range between 2-3% of the premium paid, relative to annuities with prices based on the Lee-Carter model, for annuitants aged 65 and over. In trying to measure adverse selection, Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown (1999) undertook a related exercise, calculating the money's worth of annuities using SSA mortality projections. If the LeeCarter model provides an unbiased estimate of mortality improvements, then their calculations will overstate the actuarial unfairness of annuities, and furthermore if individuals have "rational expectations" based on the Lee-Carter model, then that makes the low level of voluntary annuitization even more of a puzzle than hitherto suspected.
In Section 4, we consider how annuity providers of any type might efficiently shed aggregate mortality risk by purchasing mortality-contingent bonds. Mortality bonds have recently been issued or proposed, and we price one such bond using the Capital Asset Pricing Model and the Consumption CAPM. According to the CAPM, investors will prefer assets with returns that negatively covary with financial market returns. They will accept an expected return that is smaller than the risk-free rate to hold such an asset and will demand a return that is greater to hold assets that positively covary with the market. According to the CCAPM, investors will prefer assets that offer high returns just when consumption happens to be low, relative to assets such as stocks that tend to offer high returns when consumption is high.
We calculate the annual returns that would have been earned on mortalitycontingent bonds, had they been available in the U.S. in 1959-1999. We model them on one that was recently proposed, though not issued, by the European Investment Bank. The covariance of the returns on such hypothetical bonds with the stock market was close to zero, while the covariance with per capita consumption growth was slightly negative. Consequently, under the CAPM investors would require little or no premium to hold such a bond, and under the CCAPM they would accept a discount to do so, thus paying a little to shed longevity risk. Although it was small, the proposed discount on the EIB bond would have required investors to pay more than either model predicts for the opportunity to shed aggregate mortality risk.
Section 5 summarizes. We conclude that annuity providers -including insurance companies that sell voluntary annuities, employers that offer defined benefit pensions, and the U.S government through Social Security and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation -face substantial aggregate mortality risk. Were annuity providers to hedge such risk by purchasing mortality-contingent bonds, we calculate that they could do so at extremely low cost. These results are noteworthy, as the problem of correlated risks is broad, as is the potential use of financial securities to manage such risk. Similar concerns arise in the insurance of long-term care risk and of catastrophic risk arising from natural disasters and terrorism.
QUANTIFYING AGGREGATE MORTALITY RISK

The Lee-Carter Model
Wong-Fupay and Haberman's (2004) review of research on population mortality forecasts has a valuable discussion about the use of mortality models to quantify uncertainty surrounding mortality forecasts. Actuarial models often produce only point estimates, and many of the intervals bounded by high and low scenarios in official mortality projections appear somewhat narrow. Blake and Burrows (2001) show that plausible assumptions about forecasting errors can lead to quite imprecise estimates of actuarially fair annuity yields. With mortality uncertainty rising over longer time horizons, they find that confidence intervals are wider for escalating annuities whose benefits are back-loaded.
However, studies of that type provide essentially ad-hoc calculations based on authors' estimates of the likely level of mortality-table forecasting error. What is required is a means of quantifying the forecasting error. We employ the Lee-Carter (1992) model, which is, as we described earlier, the most widely-used model of population mortality improvements. In the Lee-Carter model, mortality risk m at age x in year t is
The parameters a and b vary with age. Lee-Carter find that k declined roughly linearly over the period , which translates into a decreasing rate of increase in life expectancy. They estimate that a random walk with drift fits the time path of k, as follows:
(2) k t = k t-1 -0.365 + 5.24 flu + e t where flu is the impact of the 1918 epidemic. According to these results, a one standard-deviation shock to k translates into a roughly two-month change in age-65 life expectancy. The fitted model explains well over 90% of within-age group variances in mortality rates.
We use this model and its estimated parameters to forecast mortality rates by age and future year. Importantly for our purposes, we can calculate forecasts and associated confidence intervals of future mortality rates at birth or conditional on reaching a given age. For example, the model predicts life expectancy at birth in 2065 of 86.05 years, with a 95% confidence interval of [80.45, 89.95] years, which appears relatively wide. Lee and Miller (2001) found that the model under-predicted gains in insample forecasts but only by small amounts and that the confidence intervals were a little too wide over the time horizons that might concern insurance companies and bondholders. From the viewpoint of an insurance company selling annuities, the latter type of error provides insurance against the former. Tuljapurkar, Li, and Boe (2000) found that the model applied not only in the United States, but also in the other G-7 countries with different estimated parameters.
While the model suffers from potential weaknesses noted by others, they do not generally concern our application. (1) The parameter values depend on the period over which they are estimated, but not by much, so our results will be relatively unaffected by our choice of base period. (2) The error term may not adequately capture shocks that are so rare that they appear in the data only infrequently, if at all. We find that allowing for low probability events, such as a repetition of the 1918 flu epidemic, that temporarily raise mortality (and benefit annuity providers) has little effect on our results.
10 A large and permanent mortality reduction or a permanent increase in the rate of mortality decline would, in contrast, have disastrous consequences for annuity providers. (3) Bell (1997) shows that setting a x to fit initial age-specific mortality data exactly produces somewhat superior forecasts. We adopt this modification where appropriate. (4) Over short forecasting intervals, the errors associated with estimating the parameters a and b dominate the variability of the k t forecasts; over the life of an annuity, the reverse is true, however, and errors in forecasting k, which are our focus, dominate. (5) Booth, Maindonald, and Smith (2002) find a substantial age-time interaction that improves the model's fit to Australian data. We do not incorporate such a term. Its importance has not been demonstrated for the U.S., and we find later that innovations to k vary little with age in any given year. (6) The Lee-Carter model was estimated on combined male and female data. Although mortality recently declined faster for men than women, the gender difference in the rate of mortality decline shows signs of disappearing and has been reversed in some periods. If annuities are bought by men and women in roughly equal numbers, so that insurers get to pool this particular risk, then gender differences in mortality trends only concern us when they help project population-level mortality. 11 We will discuss such instances as we proceed. (7) Ruhm (2004) found a correlation between U.S. business cycles and mortality. However, the estimated effects of cyclical fluctuations are small and temporary, whereas the larger shocks that Lee-Carter identify affect not only current but also future mortality.
We note in passing that authors have proposed other enhancements to the Lee-Carter model (Renshaw and Haberman 2003a , 2003b , Brouhns, Denuit, and Vermunt 2002 . Alternately, other stochastic models besides Lee-Carter are available (Lee 2000 , Yang 2001 , Milevsky and Promislow 2001 , Dahl 2004 , Currie, Durban, and Eilers 2004 , Cairns, Blake, and Dowd 2006 . In particular, Sanderson and Scherbov (2004) , in contrast to Lee-Carter and most others, project no deceleration in the rate of mortality improvement, based on data from fourteen countries. 12 We retain the original model, though, since it is widely accepted and offers published parameter values for U.S. data, and the differences in the predictions of other models (besides Sanderson-Scherbov) are not substantial.
Comparing Lee-Carter with Social Security Administration Forecasts
The Lee-Carter model was originally estimated using mortality data up to 1989. We therefore examine forecasts over two periods: 1990 to 2002, when both LeeCarter and Social Security Administration (SSA) forecasts from the 1993 Trustees' Report can be compared with actual mortality improvements; and 2003 onwards.
13 11 The reasons for recent differences are not well understood and seem to include different health behaviors like smoking, as we discuss later. We choose not to account for the impact of specific behaviors, as an attraction of the Lee-Carter model is that it captures the uncertainty surrounding forecasts of behavior. 12 They analyze "best practice" life expectancy by determining the average life expectancy in the country that, at a point in time, has the greatest life expectancy.
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The SSA actuaries forecast mortality by combining age-specific trend extrapolation with information collected from medical experts. Figures 1 and 2 shows actual mortality rates from 1990 to 2002 for males and females aged 65-94, with some surprising patterns observed among the oldest women. The figures also show the SSA 1989 intermediate forecast and an ageweighted forecast from the Lee-Carter model. The Lee-Carter model forecasts an age-weighted mortality decline of 1.12% per year for the over-65s. In contrast, the SSA intermediate forecast predicts male and female mortality declines of 0.54 and 0.50%. It transpired that mortality declined much more rapidly among men than women, and more rapidly among the younger old than the oldest old. Male mortality declined a little faster than the Lee-Carter forecast and much faster than the SSA forecast at ages 65-69, 70-74, and 75-79 . This was true of none of the female age groups after 1992, and mortality actually rose among women aged 85-89 and 90-94 after the mid-1990s.
14 While the Lee-Carter forecasts did not closely match recent mortality trends, the annual age-weighted mortality changes mostly fall within the LeeCarter 95% confidence interval. Furthermore, these patterns highlight the inherent difficulty in forecasting mortality and hence in managing aggregate mortality risk. Preston and Wang (2005) investigated the recent narrowing of the male-female life expectancy differential, which dropped from around 7.8 years in 1972-79 to 5.3 years in 2003. They found a delayed response to an earlier increase in smoking by women, which can explain the recent anomaly. They project an acceleration in mortality reductions even if smoking rates do not change further, with faster reductions among males because their smoking rates have declined more. Also, recent estimates from the National Center for Health Statistics indicate a rapid resumption of declines in overall mortality, with an ageadjusted death rate of 845.3 per 100,000 in 2002, 832.7 in 2003, and 801 in 2004. Looking forward in Figure 3 , the SSA continues to be less optimistic than Lee-Carter. The SSA provides high, intermediate, and low mortality forecasts. Among the over 65s and taking 2002 as a baseline, the SSA projects annual mortality reductions of 0.24, 0.47, and 0.70% under the three forecasts, jumping to 0.29, 0.67, and 1.16% in 2030. 15 The intermediate forecast (0.47%, then 0.67%) predicts that mortality will initially decline at the pace experienced between 1979 and 2002 and then almost at the pace of 0.72% experienced between 1900 and 2002. The high forecast starts out at the higher rate of mortality decline and then accelerates. The Lee-Carter model results in forecasted mortality reductions that are considerably higher than even the SSA's initial "high" forecast of 0.70%. Based on 1900-89 data, Lee-Carter forecasts a future age-sex weighted average mortality reduction of 1.12% a year.
16 This is almost the same as the SSA "high" forecast of 1.16% from 2030 on.
14 Historically, percentage reductions in mortality have been higher among the young. Population mortality declined by an average of 1.06% per year from 1900 to 2001 and 0.72% per year from 1979 to 2001. 15 The SSA does not break down their projected declines by age within this group. 16 As the Lee-Carter model is log-linear, the forecast percentage decline in mortality each period is constant at b x (E t k t+1 -k t ). This varies with age, but not with calendar year. 
Comparing Lee Carter with Actuarial Forecasts
Next, we compare mortality declines projected by the Lee-Carter model with the projection scale for annuitants and pension plan members that actuaries commonly refer to. Projection Scale AA is the most recent one that the Society of Actuaries (SOA) has issued. It blends Federal Civil Service and Social Security mortality improvements from 1977 to 1993, subject to various adjustments that smooth and place upper and lower bounds on the forecasts. When preparing the RP-2000 life tables, the SOA considered whether to update Scale AA and concluded that it was consistent with recent trends.
17 Potentially, the population on which Scale AA was based differs from annuitants. Annuity purchasers in the U.S. are much wealthier than average (Dushi and Webb 2004) , and socioeconomic mortality differentials widened in the recent past, as seen in Willetts (1999) for the U.K. and Schalick et al (2000) for the U.S. from 1967-1986. However, it is not known whether U.S. mortality differentials have continued to widen since 1986 and hence whether the current rate of mortality decline may 17 "The RP-2000 Mortality Tables" page 73. Projection Scale AA is also reported in this publication in Table 7 -3. differ between annuitants and non-annuitants. 18 If so, then forecasts based on population trends, like those derived from Lee-Carter, will underestimate reductions in annuitant mortality. Uncertainty as to the future course of socioeconomic mortality differences will, in any case, contribute to the nondiversifiable mortality risk faced by insurance companies. Figure 3 shows that the SOA forecast, based on Scale AA from the RP-2000 life tables, lies extremely closely to the SSA intermediate forecast. Table 1 compares the mortality declines by age group projected by the Lee-Carter model and by the Projection Scale AA. Scale AA forecasts a slower pace of overall mortality reductions than Lee-Carter does, which is unsurprising since the SOA data is based on a limited time period when mortality declined relatively slowly. The age-sex weighted average for Scale AA is 0.87% for the whole population and 0.69% for the over 65s. From ages 45-79, the Scale AA and Lee-Carter forecasts are remarkably close. From age 80 upwards, Scale AA projects successively smaller percentage reductions in mortality, approaching zero at age 100 plus. In contrast, Lee-Carter projects somewhat larger reductions in mortality over age 80 than at ages 45-79.
The disagreement above age 80 is particularly important. Mortality rates are much higher at these ages, so a given percentage reduction in mortality has a disproportionate effect on annual survival probabilities. Mortality rates at old ages are even more important to insurance companies because most annuities are purchased by older households. Moreover, if the annuitant population continues to enjoy better than average mortality reductions, even the Lee-Carter forecasts may prove to be too conservative.
QUANTIFYING THE MORTALITY RISK FACED BY ANNUITY PROVIDERS
In this section, we use simulations to quantify the aggregate mortality risk faced by an insurance company selling annuities to a single birth cohort. We calculate the combination of capital and premium loading that would reduce the risk of insolvency to specified percentages. 19 The extent to which aggregate mortality risk actually affects annuity prices depends on the attitude of insurance company shareholders. If that risk were uncorrelated with overall stock market risk, then shareholders would not require any premium. In practice, insolvency and agency costs may magnify the effect of mortality-related losses, leading shareholders to demand an aggregate mortality risk premium.
To focus on aggregate mortality risk, we impose a number of simplifications. We assume that the annuity provider sells a "large" number of annuities of a single type to people in a single birth cohort who have populationaverage mortality and changes in mortality rates as predicted by the In reality, as we noted earlier, higher socio-economic classes may experience more rapid declines in mortality, which would amplify our findings. We assume that the annuity price is set so that the provider breaks even at expected mortality rates, given that the provider has zero administrative expenses and invests in a risk-free asset offering either a 3 or 5% real return while selling a level real annuity, or else invests in a risk-free asset offering a 3% real return while selling a real annuity that increases at 3%. 21 We select values of a to fit the SSA's forecast of 2006 period mortality for males and females separately. 19 It would not be feasible to take the alternative approach of using price data and backing out expected mortality improvements from that. A single price is consistent with many possible rates of improvement depending on assumptions about expenses, profits, current period mortality, and the cost of capital. 20 We take current population rather than annuitant mortality as our starting point, as the LeeCarter model was estimated on population data. We obtain very similar results if we start with annuitant mortality instead. We also ignore adverse selection, which likely affects this market already (Finkelstein and Poterba 2004) . 21 This last possibility is equivalent to earning a 0% real return and selling a level real annuity. A 3% real return is the common assumption in the academic literature, though the long-run risk-free Mortality outcomes may differ in three ways from expectations as given by the Lee-Carter model. First, the time trend of -0.365 in equation (2) is estimated rather than known for certain, so the uncertainty associated with that estimate should be taken into account when forecasting mortality trends. Second, in each period there is a mortality shock -the e t term in equation (2). We incorporate the first two factors. While the a and b terms in equation (1) are also estimated, and an idiosyncratic mortality shock e x,t from (1) occurs in each period, Appendix B in Lee-Carter shows that it is reasonable to ignore those sources of error when forecasting life expectancy, and also discusses the properties of the error terms more generally. 22 Third, there may be gender differences in the rate of mortality declines, exposing insurers to additional risk which we do not capture unless they have a balanced portfolio of male and female lives.
We run 10,000 Monte-Carlo simulations of the evolution of aggregate mortality. In each simulation, we make a single draw from a normal distribution with mean -0.365 and standard deviation 0.069, the values associated with LeeCarter's estimated k trend in (2). This gives us the baseline time trend for that particular simulation. In the next step of each simulation, we obtain the error term e t for each year by making a draw from a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation 0.655, the values associated with Lee-Carter's estimation of e t . We fill in the value of k year by year using these draws added to the particular k trend and use equation (1) to calculate the associated annual mortality risk. From these 10,000 simulations, we construct separate male and female mortality tables, assuming that the ratio of mortality rates is equal to the gender-weighted average of population mortality rates reported by SSA by age and birth cohort. 23 We calculate annual survival probabilities, discount the resulting cohort annuity payments by a rate of interest, and sum the payments to arrive at a present value. We calculate the return earned by the annuity provider by comparing this present value with the premium paid, calculated under the same assumptions.
The insurance company makes a loss if, in a particular simulation, the mortality draw it experiences results in payments that exceed the premium net of mark-up. We calculate the percentage markup over an actuarially fair premium that the insurer requires in order to reduce the probability of loss to either 5 or rate as measured by TIPS is well below 3% currently. Zero administrative expenses is a common simplifying assumption as well, and insurance companies are starting to offer real annuities. 22 The e x,t shocks which we ignore only affect mortality in a single period and have a little effect on the value of the annuity provider's obligations. Even if mortality reaches zero in some year, the number of surviving annuitants will only be 2% or so more than expected, and, importantly, will have the same expected mortality as before. 23 It would be preferable to use annuitant life tables, but these are only available for periods, not cohorts.
1%
. 24 The markup can also be interpreted as the percentage of the expected present value of annuity payments that the insurer must hold as capital to reduce the probability of insolvency, or the combination of markup and capital that is required. Table 2 reports our results for annuities issued to married couples (with survivor benefits of 50 or 100%), single women, and single men aged 65, 70, 75, 80, and 85. 25 For an insurance company selling joint life and 50% survivor annuities with a real return of 3% to couples aged 65, a combination of shareholders' capital and premium loading equal to 2.69% of the premium is 24 These targets are chosen for illustrative purposes and will likely differ from what a profitmaximizing insurer chooses, taking account of agency costs, reputation risk, etc., or from what a regulator might impose. 25 For couples, we assume that both spouses are of the same age. We obtain almost identical results when we assume that the wife is three years younger than the husband. required to reduce the probability of loss or insolvency to 5%. Shareholders' capital or loading of 3.80% is required to reduce the probability to 1%.
At any given interest rate, liabilities falling due in the more distant future are subject to greater aggregate mortality risk, but also greater time discounting of that risk. Annuities of the same type sold to younger households, compared to older households, have longer durations, while joint life and 100% survivor annuities have longer durations than joint life and 50% survivor annuities, which have longer durations than female and finally male single life annuities. At the 3 and 5% interest rates, we find that the effect of time discounting dominates the effect of greater aggregate mortality risk, resulting in a strong negative impact of duration (as indicated by age and annuity type) on estimated potential losses. While intuition might suggest that annuities sold to younger households and to married couples, who are longer lived in expectation, would be riskier, the heavy discounting of the distant future makes these annuity types substantially less risky. This is not true of the 3% increasing annuity, where the effects of duration and time discounting more or less offset each other.
These results may help explain some findings in other research about annuities. Brown, Mitchell, and Poterba (2002) report that inflation-linked annuities are sold at more actuarially unfair prices than level annuities. Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) obtain a similar result and attribute this to adverse selection, since increasing annuities are particularly attractive to low-mortality types. Our results suggest that the higher prices also reflect the greater aggregate mortality risk to which sellers of increasing annuities are exposed.
The calculations in this section are similar in spirit to those in Dowd, Cairns, and Blake (2005) of value-at-risk and expected shortfall for U.K. annuity providers.
26 They estimate a 90% value-at-risk for long-dated coupon-paying mortality bonds of between 4 and 5% of the premium, depending on whether they allow for parameter uncertainty. Their results are of the same order of magnitude as ours, though somewhat higher. Given considerable differences in mortality patterns between the countries, it is valuable to undertake calculations specifically for the U.S., and we build on our results in the rest of the paper. 27 Lastly, we consider the possibility of an abrupt medical breakthrough, although even major innovations are likely to have incremental effects on mortality. Olshansky, Carnes, and Cassel (1990) calculate that eliminating all 26 They use the two-factor mortality model developed in Cairns, Blake, and Dowd (2006) . As we only have price data for a single hypothetical mortality bond, it is not possible to determine the relative weights that financial markets might place on each factor. They calculate risk premia for mortality bonds of various maturities and initial cohort ages, assuming alternative weightings. 27 British mortality is lower below the age of 65, but increasingly higher above that age (Deaton and Paxson 2004) , and mortality improvements in the U.S. lead changes in Britain by about four years on average. cancer and ischemic heart disease, while an unrealistic prospect, would raise life expectancy at age 50 by 6.57 years for females and 7.83 years for males; and eliminating cancer, all circulatory diseases, and diabetes would raise it by 15.30 and 15.02 years. The latter gains correspond to a 75% reduction in mortality from all causes, which would occur with less than a 0.01% probability over a 30-year horizon under the Lee-Carter model. An instantaneous shock of this type would raise the expected present value of payments on a joint life and 50% survivor annuity by 50.7%. In fact, insurers would not actually suffer losses of that magnitude, as they would raise prices to new purchasers while mortality declined gradually and payments to existing annuitants rose by lesser amounts.
To sum up, we find that the combination of shareholders' capital and/or premium loadings that would be required to reduce the probability of insolvency to 5% or 1% is considerable. It lies in the range of 2.7-4.7% for a joint life and 50% survivor annuity with a 3% real return sold to couples aged 65-85. In addition, applying mark-ups such as these might deter high-expected mortality individuals from annuitizing, exacerbating adverse selection.
THE PRICING OF AGGREGATE MORTALITY RISK BY ANNUITY PROVIDERS
When we calculated the required premium loading for insurers to offset mortality risk, we assumed that insurers price annuities in accordance with Lee-Carter. To the best of our knowledge, no published research has worked out the financial implications of the differences between Lee-Carter predictions versus actuarial life tables. In doing so we find that, by the Lee-Carter benchmark, insurers would systematically underprice annuities if they use Projection Scale AA without adjusting their pricing formulas elsewhere. This finding is a corollary of our earlier results that Scale AA appears to understate expected mortality improvements.
Methodology
It would be difficult to use pricing data from insurance companies to determine whether aggregate mortality risk is correctly priced. Annuity prices reflect not only an insurer's views about aggregate mortality risk but also unobservable information about expenses, asset returns, and the expected mortality of its particular annuitants. Given these difficulties, we focus instead on evaluating the up-to-date recommendations made by the SOA in their Projection Scale AA.
In practice, actuaries develop "prudent best estimates" of mortality by constructing life tables based on both their own experience and published life tables and then adding a conservative margin reflecting various types of uncertainty -over not only the future path of mortality but also, for example, the degree of adverse selection that they may experience. The American Academy of Actuaries Variable Annuity Reserve Working Group specifically proposes that actuaries be required to take account of mortality improvements when that would err on the side of caution, and permits them to do so otherwise. 28 The assumption relating to such improvements must be based on "current relevant data" with an unspecified margin for error in the appropriate direction. Our calculations will therefore overstate the degree of underpricing to the extent that a particular insurer's "conservative margin" is in fact protecting against underestimates of mortality improvements in Scale AA.
We calculate the expected present value (EPV) of payments from a $1-ayear annuity under various assumptions about mortality declines and, as before, assuming a 3% real interest rate and zero administrative costs. We assume that the Annuity 2000 mortality table from the SOA correctly describes current mortality of people buying the annuity. 29 We then take the ratio of the EPV computed using forecasts from the Lee-Carter model to the EPV computed using Projection Scale AA. This reveals the extent to which using Scale AA would contribute to underpricing of annuities. The ratio will exceed 100% if and only if the Lee-Carter forecasts are more optimistic about future mortality than Projection Scale AA.
Analysis of Potential Underpricing
The EPVs in Table 3 are in all cases greater than 100% of the premium paid, which indicates potential underpricing according to Lee-Carter. The extent of the underpricing if annuity providers were using Scale AA ranges from 1.6 to 3.7%. Underpricing is greater at older ages because Lee-Carter assumes little age-related variation in the rate of mortality declines at older ages, whereas Scale AA assumes a sharp deceleration, since Scale AA is based on the recent mortality trends that we presented earlier. Underpricing is, at all ages, greater for women than men, again because Scale AA is based on recent data, whereas the LeeCarter model only allows for unisex improvement. Preston and Wang (2005) , as we mentioned, predict a narrowing of sex mortality differentials, in which case the lesser underpricing of male annuities may be illusory. To sum up, if the LeeCarter model indeed provides an unbiased forecast of mortality improvements, 28 http://www.actuary.org/pdf/life/varwg_0305.pdf 29 We chose the Annuity 2000 life tables (www.soa.org) over others, like those from SSA, because we focus on the individual annuity market. As the same table is used for both EPV calculations, our conclusions hold irrespective of what table the insurer may use, although the magnitude of the difference between EPVs would be slightly affected. then insurers using Projection Scale AA would underprice annuities by amounts that could have a substantial effect on insurance company solvency. Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown (1999) undertake a related calculation to determine the value of annuities to potential annuitants, rather than the pricing of annuities by insurance companies as we do. Their calculations are based on period tables projected using SSA forecasts of mortality improvements, and those projections are underestimated according to Lee-Carter. Assuming, again , that the Lee-Carter projections are unbiased, our results imply that Mitchell et al somewhat overstate the actuarial unfairness of annuities. The low rate of voluntary annuitization may therefore be even more puzzling than it previously appeared. 
THE PRICING AGGREGATE MORTALITY RISK IN FINANCIAL MARKETS
Given our evidence of substantial aggregate mortality risk, this section discusses how insurers or other annuity providers might reduce their exposure. We describe mortality-contingent bonds and calculate the returns that investors would have experienced on one such bond, had it been available in the U.S. over the period . To price the bonds, we outline the Capital and the Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Models; present data on the relationship between mortalitycontingent bond returns, stock market returns, and consumption growth; and show how the use of mortality-contingent bonds would influence annuity prices. 30 It also cannot be explained by individuals mistakenly overestimating their own mortality risk. Gong and Webb (2005) conclude that HRS households generally hold reasonable beliefs about their survival, since aggregated subjective beliefs resemble published mortality tables, with no evidence of systematic underestimation, and they co-vary appropriately with education and ethnicity.
Mortality-Contingent Bonds
As of 2006, only two mortality-contingent bonds had been issued and another one proposed. In 2003 Swiss Re issued the first of two short-term bonds, a $400 million three-year bond paying LIBOR plus 135 basis points. The bond provides that, if a five-country weighted mortality index exceeds 130% of the 2002 level (i.e., mortality rises substantially), then the principal will be reduced. If it exceeds 150%, the principal will be exhausted. They issued a similar bond in 2005. In November 2004 the European Investment Bank (EIB) announced a ₤540 million bond with a life of 25 years, although it was not issued. Instead of making payments of interest and principal, the mortality-related payments on the EIB bond would decline proportionately with the annual survival rate of the U.K. male population aged 65 in 2003, subject to a short time lag. Life insurers should go short on the Swiss Re bond and annuity providers should go long on the EIB bond in order to reduce their exposure to aggregate mortality risk. Since we focus on annuities, we will make calculations to price the EIB bond. Cairns, Blake, and Dowd (2005) report that the EIB bond, based on its prospectus, was to be issued at an expected yield that was some 20 basis points lower than that at which similar non-mortality related EIB bonds traded -in other words, the bond price incorporated a mortality risk discount, not a premium.
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While risk-averse annuity providers should be willing to pay a premium to transfer aggregate mortality risk to a third party, the market price of that risk will, according to the CAPM and CCAPM, be determined by its covariance with other sources of risk -a point which drives our discussion of asset pricing.
Historical Returns
Our goal is to calculate the returns that investors would have experienced had the EIB bond been available in the U.S. market in past years. We assume that investors would have believed that the Lee-Carter model correctly described mortality improvements and would have used those beliefs to price the bond. In the Lee-Carter model, the expected mortality decline for people of age x equals 0.365b x , and the percentage deviation of actual from expected mortality in period t+1 can be expressed as
or b x e t+1 +e x,t+1 . The Berkeley Human Mortality database has U.S. period life tables for 1959-1999. Based on these tables, we calculate the yearly percentage change in mortality at each age from 65 on. We compare this with the change predicted by Lee-Carter and recover, for each year, a vector of combined mortality shocks, b x e t+1 +e x,t+1 . We are interested in e t+1 , which affects all ages equally, will affect the expected value of k in all future years, and will thus have a substantial effect on the value of the bond. The e x,t+1 term varies with age, only affects current-period mortality, and will thus have a negligible effect on the value of the bond. We take several steps to investigate features of the mortality shocks that we calculate. We begin by confirming that the Lee-Carter specification fits the data well. 32 We also expect the mortality shocks to have a mean close to zero, and the sample mean of 0.034 is not significantly different from zero. An important assumption is that the e t+1 shocks affect every age x in the same way. We find that the combined shocks do not, in fact, vary much with age. In any given year, these mortality shocks are almost invariably of the same sign across ages, and usually of a similar magnitude. This indicates that an adverse shock would affect a company's obligations across all age groups more or less proportionately to the age-specific amounts we calculate later in Table 4 . Hence insurers could not offset their aggregate mortality risk much by diversifying across cohorts. Importantly, it also suggests that the age-specific e x,t+1 term is small relative to the common e t+1 term. We proceed by treating these estimated mortality shocks as revealing the annual value of e t+1 .
To continue, the financial impact of these persistent mortality shocks which we calculate equals not only the change in the payment that the bondholder receives in the current period, but also the present value of the changes that are now expected in all future years. We express the mortality shock for each of the years 1960-1999 in terms of the innovation to k and calculate the impact of that innovation on the numbers expected to survive each year and consequently on the EPV of the income stream from the bond, assuming that investors use forecasts from the Lee-Carter model. The effect on the income stream depends on the duration of the bond and age of the reference population. We express the impact of the k innovation as a percentage of the market value of the bond prior to the shock, using a 3% interest rate. To illustrate, when the reference population is aged 65, the resulting mean of this percentage change in the bond's market value is 0.04%, very close to zero as expected, and the standard deviation 0.64.
The standard deviation rises with the age of the reference population but remains very small. By comparison, the general consensus is that the standard deviation of stock returns is about 17 to 20%, or roughly thirty times greater.
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This initial result suggests that, if investors used the Lee-Carter model to forecast mortality and price mortality bonds and if the Lee-Carter model provided unbiased estimates, then an EIB-type bond would have been a relatively low risk investment.
Capital Asset Pricing Models
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
The CAPM decomposes risk into its systematic and specific components. Specific risk does not command a premium because it can be diversified away. Systematic risk cannot be eliminated similarly through diversification. The magnitude of the risk premium that an investor requires to hold a risky asset like a mortality bond equals its beta, defined as
the covariance of the bond with the market return, divided by the variance of the market. The expected return on the mortality bond equals
the risk-free rate plus beta multiplied by the excess of the expected market return over the risk-free rate. Insurance companies selling annuities are, of course, owned either directly or indirectly by individual investors. The company's cost of capital and the price it must charge for annuities will therefore reflect the return those investors require, which in turn depends on the company's beta. Mehra and Prescott (2003) provide an overview of the CCAPM. What determines the premium for systematic risk in the CCAPM is not its relationship to general market risk but rather to the marginal utility of consumption. When consumption suffers in a particular period, then utility in that period will be correspondingly low and marginal utility high relative to other periods. Extra income from investments is relatively more valuable at that time than at others. Thus, investors require a risk premium for holding assets whose returns are positively correlated with shocks to overall consumption because those assets provide the biggest payoffs in states of the world in which consumption is unexpectedly high and the marginal utility of consumption low. Conversely, investors place a high value on assets that offer high returns when consumption is unexpectedly low and the marginal utility of consumption high and will buy such assets even when the expected return is less than the risk-free rate. Because it prices systematic risk in relation to the rest of an individual's wealth and to the intertemporal nature of financial decisions, the CCAPM may be theoretically preferable to the CAPM when considering annuities, which are crucial for smoothing life-cycle marginal utility in the presence of lifespan risk.
The Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM)
Mathematically, the CCAPM implies that
so the expected return on the risky mortality bond in period t+1 equals the riskfree rate plus the covariance of the bond return with the marginal utility of consumption. Some algebra and assumptions result in:
where γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and σ b,c is the log of the covariance of consumption growth with the bond return. A negative covariance commands a discount below the risk-free rate, so R f > R b , and the discount increases with the coefficient of risk aversion.
Pricing the EIB Bond Using the CAPM and CCAPM
Pricing Using the CAPM
We estimate a beta on EIB-type mortality bonds that varies with the age of the reference population, had such bonds been available over the period 1959-1999. We assume that the S&P 500 represents market returns. 35 The age-65 beta, for example, is 0.005 with a 95% confidence interval of [-0.005, 0.015] . 36 All the point estimates for the betas suggest little or no correlation of the mortality bonds 34 The assumptions, which are standard (cf. Mehra 2003) , are that equity and stock returns are jointly log-normally distributed and that consumption growth and risky asset returns are both i.i.d. 35 We recognize that the S&P500 is a commonly used proxy for the undetermined "market portfolio" (Roll 1977) . The S&P 500 is a capitalization-weighted index of large capitalization stocks that is strongly positively correlated with other domestic stock returns. The correlations of the S&P 500 with other international equity markets is lower, so they potentially offer an even better opportunity to hedge U.S. mortality risk. 36 The beta increases with age. Thus, the required rate of return on the mortality bond and the resulting cost of insuring against aggregate mortality risk also rise with age, but the age effects are never substantial.
with the market. 37 Since the immediate annuity market is quite small, at roughly $10 billion, then transferring all of the aggregate mortality risk to financial markets would expose an investor holding the market portfolio to only a very small change in risk. Opinion differs as to the size of the equity premium, but at a plausible level of 500 basis points, the beta would suggest a premium of 2½ basis points (since 2½ = 0.005*500) above the risk-free rate, with a 95% confidence interval of [-2½, 7½ ] , when the reference population is aged 65, along with similar premiums of similar magnitudes at other ages. In contrast to the results for mortality bonds, the fact that equity offers the highest returns when consumption growth is high should lead investors to require a modest risk premium for holding equities.
Pricing Using the CCAPM
We hypothesize that the correlation between mortality shocks and contemporaneous aggregate consumption shocks is negative, leading to a negative covariance between the growth in per-capita consumption and returns on an EIBtype bond. Mortality shocks have their greatest absolute effects at older ages, since that is when most deaths occur.
38 Suppose an unexpectedly small number of older people die in a particular year -then total national income is unlikely to rise appreciably in response because labor supply is largely fixed, as the extra numbers of mostly older people are unlikely to work, and the capital stock is fixed in the short-term as well. In consequence, per-capita income will decline because the relatively constant level of output must be shared among a greater-thanexpected number of individuals.
39 Moreover, to the extent that the mortality shock is global, one country could not borrow from another to offset the consumption shock. A final point is that reductions in mortality may result from higher medical spending, leaving less money available for general consumption. 40 37 The lack of any substantial correlation here is consistent with the small estimated effects of business cycle conditions on aggregate mortality which Ruhm (2004) describes. 38 This is not true in percentage terms -the value of b in the Lee-Carter model declines with age, and it is b that governs the percentage impact on mortality of a shock to k. 39 Mortality shocks may affect aggregate interest rates by altering the shares of national income taken by labor and capital. A major adverse mortality shock makes capital abundant and labor scarce. Ralph Higden, a contemporary English chronicler, documented how wages jumped and rents fell in the aftermath of the Black Death, which killed one-third of the European population during 1347-1352. The focus of our paper, though, is on the additional risk premium that a mortality bond should command relative to a similar non-mortality linked bond, with both bonds affected in the same way by a shift in the risk-free interest rate. 40 This problem also arises with the CAPM. A potentially related problem with the CAPM is that an aggregate mortality shock may alter subjective beliefs about future longevity and therefore consumption plans and the current marginal utility of consumption. In contrast, the CCAPM takes account of this behavioral response, to the extent that it alters aggregate consumption. We
We indeed find that per-capita consumption and the returns on the pseudo-EIB bond that we simulated above co-vary negatively.
41 Consumption growth is a relatively smooth series with a mean of 2.25% and a standard deviation of 1.20%. The correlation between consumption growth and mortality bond returns is -0.1958, when the reference population is aged 65, and it is significantly different from zero irrespective of their age. Thus, over the period we examine, mortality bonds would have provided their holders with the highest returns in periods when the rate of consumption growth was low and the marginal utility of consumption was correspondingly high.
It follows from the CCAPM that investors should accept a risk discount for holding mortality bonds, and given the statistical significance of our estimate, they should not pay a risk premium. 42 In contrast, the literature has found a large positive correlation between stock returns and consumption growth of about 0.5. Though the correlation between mortality bond returns and consumption growth is some 40% smaller in absolute value (when the reference population is aged 65), the standard deviation of mortality bond returns is much less than that of equities. As a result, the covariance between mortality bond returns and consumption growth is extremely close to zero at -0.0013%. Applying the CCAPM, the risk discount is only two basis points when the coefficient of risk aversion is ten.
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Sensitivity
At this point we will examine the sensitivity of our analysis to some issues that we discussed earlier related to the nature of mortality shocks. We have done additional calculations to verify that market prices are unlikely to be influenced calculate that, at plausible coefficients of risk aversion, the effect of aggregate mortality shocks on an individual's marginal utility of consumption are likely to be extremely small. 41 We follow convention by focusing on consumption of non-durables and services from the National Income and Product Accounts. The correct variable, though difficult to measure, would be the consumption of holders of stock in insurance companies. Their consumption is more highly correlated with the stock market (Mankiw and Zeldes 1991) , which would deepen the risk discount on an asset that negatively covaries with the market. 42 Here we assume that agents are aware that aggregate mortality has improved. The government only publishes the data on which EIB bond payments are based after the year's end, and the payments on the proposed bond reflected lagged survival rates. Were such bonds to become widespread, investors should find it worthwhile to collect contemporaneous mortality data, and so bond prices would reflect current mortality shocks. 43 A potential limitation is that neither the CAPM nor the CCAPM has a role for mortality. Households will revise their own mortality beliefs in the face of an aggregate shock that reduces mortality. Unless the mortality shock is associated with improvements in health that raise human capital, the household will reduce per period consumption, raising the marginal utility of consumption. It is easy to show that for reasonable coefficients of risk aversion, the effect of plausible aggregate mortality shocks on the marginal utility of consumption will be small. by expectations about transitory mortality shocks. One-off shocks would have little effect on the value of the long-duration EIB bond. Since most or all one-off shocks raise mortality temporarily, rather than lowering it, we do not consider the latter. 44 The only one-off shock incorporated into the Lee-Carter model was the 1918 flu epidemic, which increased k temporarily by 5.24 relative to an annual trend decline of -0.365. Another such extreme negative event would reduce the market price of the pseudo-EIB bond by only 0.28%. 45 By way of comparison, a much smaller but permanent one-standard deviation shock to k of 0.655 has a greater -but still modest -effect on the hypothesized market price of the EIB-type bond because forward-looking investors will recognize the change in future mortality. Table 4 shows the effect on the expected present value of an EIB-type bond if a one-standard deviation k shock took place in 1989, the last year of data used to estimate Lee-Carter. The shock reduces the value of the bond by 0.61 to 1.27%, and that reduction rises with the age of the reference cohort and falls with the interest rate. These calculations demonstrate the magnitude of typical fluctuations that EIB bondholders might experience.
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Discussion
Both the CAPM and the CCAPM suggest that the EIB bond should have commanded a much smaller risk discount than the proposed 20 basis points. The design of the bond may have contributed to the size of the risk discount. In contrast to the Swiss Re bond that transferred aggregate mortality risk out to financial markets, the proposed bond transferred aggregate mortality risk in to EIB, which anticipated passing it on to insurance markets through the purchase of reinsurance from Partner Re. Both Dowd (2003) , discussing aggregate mortality risk, and Smetters (2004) , analyzing similarly non-diversifiable terrorism risk, note that daily gains and losses in financial markets dwarf potential losses from the risks in question. Smetters also notes legal and regulatory barriers (like the double taxation of investment income earned by insurance companies) that limit the capacity of the insurance market to bear risk. Financial markets may be better 44 It is difficult to think of any substantial improvements in mortality (i.e., something more than an unexpectedly mild flu season) that are not long-lasting. 45 Throughout this analysis, we assumed that investors used the Lee-Carter model to price the bond. Here, we also assume that they correctly understood that mortality experienced a oneperiod shock, after which it reverted to trend. It should be noted that Beelders and Colarossi's (2004) use of extreme value theory, with its focus on the extreme tail of the probability distribution, to price the Swiss Re bond is less relevant for the much longer-horizon EIB bond. 46 We have not undertaken similar calculations of the impact of cures for cancer and ischemic heart disease, which we discussed earlier, because we do not know the time interval over which such cures might take effect. positioned than smaller and constrained insurance markets to absorb these nondiversifiable risks, so the prospect of using reinsurance instead may have driven up the risk premium which EIB required. In evidence of this is a report that Partner Re had "little appetite for additional [EIB-type reinsurance] deals" (Cass Business School and Pensions Institute 2005). An alternative design to transfer the risk to financial markets is possible, for example by making bondholders residual claimants after survivor benefits are met. It is also possible that the yield discount, as perceived by market participants, may be less than the 20 basis points referred to by Cairns, Blake, and Dowd (2005) . The calculated discount is based on mortality forecasts by the British Government Actuary's Department (GAD). If the market expected lower future mortality, then the discount, as perceived by investors, would be correspondingly reduced. 47 We calculate that the 20 bp discount on the EIB bond would be eliminated if investors believed that mortality declines were underestimated by 0.45% a year. This represents about two-thirds of the gap for the U.S. between the intermediate SSA forecast (0.47% per year through 2030) and Lee-Carter forecasts (1.12%). Thus, differences in future mortality forecasts provide one reason why, based on GAD projections, a bigger discount might have been justified for the EIB bond than what we predicted based on past data.
The Impact of Holding Mortality-Contingent Bonds on Annuity Prices
Lastly, we show the implications of our results for the cost of hedging aggregate mortality risk. We recompute annuity prices on the assumption that the insurance company earns not the standard bond rate of return, but that rate minus the mortality risk discount that is either predicted by the CCAPM or was required by the EIB bond. 47 We assume that a similar relationship between projected mortality bond returns and consumption growth holds in the U.K. as in the U.S.
In the previous subsection, we discussed the risk discount for mortality bonds at the time of issue, when the cohort on whose lives the payments were based was aged 65 and the duration of the bond was 25 years. Since the discount will vary as the cohort ages and the number of remaining payments decreases, we repeated the calculations as the reference population aged, computing the annual risk discount until expiration. We find that the risk discount remains extremely small at all ages. 48 We then recompute the annuity's EPV, assuming that each period's annuity payment is discounted not at the risk-free rate, but at the lower age-related rates that we obtained under the CCAPM. This reveals the markup that the insurance company must charge to compensate for the lower discount rates that obtain after purchasing mortality bonds. Given the very small mortality risk discounts, the cost of an annuity to men and women of all ages increases only slightly -by less than 1% if the coefficient of risk aversion is ten. So, if annuity providers were to hedge their aggregate mortality risk in the capital markets, and if those capital markets were to price that risk in accordance with the predictions of Lee-Carter and the CCAPM, the effect on annuity prices would be extremely small.
Even if annuity providers were to pay the higher mortality risk discount of 20 basis points proposed on the EIB bond, the effect on the price of a joint life and 100% survivor annuity at age 65 would be 1.84%, assuming a 3% real interest rate. At age 85, the effect is only 0.75%. These are considerably smaller amounts than the markups (or required reserves) of around 3-4% that are required, according to Table 2 , to reduce the risk of a loss to just 5%.
CONCLUSIONS
The market for voluntary annuities in the U.S. is extremely small. In the near future, demand may well rise as unannuitized defined contribution pension plans displace annuitized defined benefit plans and if Social Security is similarly transformed using private accounts. The risk premium that insurance companies require for accepting aggregate mortality risk will influence annuity prices and therefore the extent to which the market expands.
Our results show that annuity business exposes voluntary annuity providers to substantial aggregate mortality risk. While we use Lee-Carter as a benchmark to gauge the magnitude and implications of aggregate mortality risk, the divergence among credible actuarial forecasts suggests that true confidence intervals on mortality forecasts may be even wider. Many of our conclusions about aggregate mortality risk also apply to employers that offer defined benefit pensions, as analyzed in Dushi, Friedberg, and Webb (2006) , and to the U.S. government through Social Security and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
One strategy that insurance companies or their reinsurers might adopt to deal with aggregate mortality risk is to retain it. Those investors most tolerant of aggregate mortality risk could choose to hold stock in insurance companies. However, capital imperfections highlighted by Froot (2004) may lead insurers to charge markups to bear the risk, even though the losses are uncorrelated with other losses in the reinsurance and wider financial markets. In the alternative, a scheme to transfer aggregate mortality risk to annuitants has been proposed by Piggott, Valdez, and Detzel (2005) , and the annuity contracts issued by TIAA-CREF already involve some sharing of aggregate mortality risk. Transferring this risk to risk-averse individuals is clearly inefficient, though. Yet another alternative is for the government to provide reinsurance against aggregate mortality risk (Blake and Burrows 2001) . While government involvement may crowd out market responses, 49 the government may be able to reallocate risk in ways not available to private reinsurers because it can enforce intergenerational contracts (Brown and Orszag 2006) . Meanwhile, our results suggest that annuity providers might shed aggregate mortality risk through the use of mortality-contingent bonds. Our calculations based on the CAPM and the CCAPM indicate that this might be accomplished at what is, for all practical purposes, zero cost to annuity providers. Transferring such risk to financial markets instead would be efficient as long as some investors differ in their tolerance for risk or would gain from taking the opposite position in aggregate mortality risk. On the other hand, annuity providers might partially hedge their exposure by investing in businesses such as life insurance and nursing homes with returns that may be negatively correlated with aggregate mortality risk. Since annuity providers do not appear to do this, though, the practical difficulties in adopting such a strategy may justify the type of direct hedge that we have explored.
It is relevant to consider how similar problems involving correlated risks may limit the scope of other insurance markets. Long-term care risks faced by individuals are large, yet the long-term care insurance market is very small. Cutler (1996) argues that aggregate uncertainty over the risk of utilization and cost increases may account for sharp limits on available coverage. The development of mechanisms to handle aggregate mortality risk may thus have applications in the long-term care insurance market. Smetters (2004) and Brown et al (2004) argue that private market responses to managing terrorism risk have been crowded out by public policy interventions. Our results support the argument that private markets may be able to manage these types of aggregate risks at little cost.
